Being benevolent, Mr. Cruz desires that all his students will pass all his classes. Being authoritative, he has the power to pass any or all his students in all his classes. But let us suppose that even with these two qualities, some of his students still fail some of his classes. This is I think is a reasonable possibility. If we combine this possibility with his two attributes, we have the following three propositions: P1. Cruz is benevolent in that he desires that all his students to pass all his classes.
Cruz is authoritative in that he has the power to pass any or all of his students. Some of his students fail in some his classes. Does the conjunction of these three propositions result in a contradiction? Or can all these propositions be consistently held to be true? Let us suppose that a contradiction does result from it; and that it occurs in the following ways: a If Mr.
Cruz is both benevolent and authoritative, then none of his students should fail in any of his classes. If P1 and P2 are both true, P3 must be false. Cruz is benevolent and some of his students fail in his courses, then Mr. Cruz is not really authoritative. If P1 and P3 are both true, P2 must be false. Cruz is authoritative and some of his students fail in his classes then Mr.
Cruz is not really benevolent. If P2 and P3 are both true, then P1 must be false. But are these propositions really contradictory in the above-mentioned ways? They do not seem so.
Surely, as earlier remarked, it is reasonably possible that they are all true at the same time; that Mr. Cruz is benevolent and authoritative and yet some of his students fail some his classes.
But what gives rise to this possibility? It may be thought that it is the limited nature of Mr. For even if he has the authority to pass all his students, but this authority is limited by some factors, say his judgment on whether a student deserves to pass his class or not can be changed or overridden by his coordinator or the school principal, then the fact that some of his students fail in some of his classes does not really contradict his being authoritative in passing his students.
Another, his being benevolent may not be whole or complete in the sense that he is so all the time and without any discrimination say he is more inclined to be benevolent to students who are economically poor. Given that he is benevolent only most of the time with special preference for certain students such as the poor ones , then the fact that some of his students fail some of his classes does not contradict his being benevolent or his desire to pass all this students.
In this light, to ensure that a contradiction arises from the combination of the three propositions, we need to qualify the two propositions pertaining to Mr. Cruz is wholly benevolent in that he desires all his students all the time and without any discrimination to pass all his classes P5: Mr. Cruz is fully authoritative in that his decision to pass a student cannot be overridden by any higher authority.
So now with the addition of these two propositions, can we now say or assert, without any doubt, that the conjunction of P1, P2, and P3, with P1 and P2 qualified respectively by P4 and P5 or a simpler way of saying it, the conjunction of P1 to P5 , will result in a contradiction? I believe that we still cannot. The simple reason is that Mr. Cruz, being an ideal teacher, has other positive qualities that come into play in acting benevolently and in exercising his authority.
Cruz is presumably also fair in that he will pass a student only if this student deserves it. Another, Mr. Cruz is presumably also concerned with the quality of education that he imparts with his students. This means, among others, that he ensures that his examinations are quality ones in that they he will not make them too easy so that all his students will pass these examinations.
Thus, if we assume that Mr. Cruz is wholly benevolent and fully authoritative in the above senses, still some of his students will fail some of his classes because Mr. Cruz is also fair and a quality educator. In his formulation of the problem of evil, Mackie claims that if God is wholly good and infinitely omnipotent then God should eliminate evil completely. This is correct only if God is only wholly good and infinitely omnipotent. But God, as the perfect being, is much more than being wholly good and infinitely omnipotent.
We say that God, being the perfect being, has all the desirable qualities there are; and so God must also be just and wise, among others. If God is just then He should punish evil persons and reward good persons appropriately. Since rewards are a kind of good, and punishments a kind of evil, if God completely eliminates evil then He will, in some cases, will be unjust.
An unjust God is of course not God. Or, if we say that God is wise then we must assume that there must be some good reason for why He allows evil to occur, whatever that reason may be, and whether or not we can ever know that reason.
If we believe that God is a perfect being, then we must also believe that there is wisdom in all He does, even if we sometimes cannot comprehend it or we personally cannot make sense of what is happening around us. Mackie is correct that the existence of a wholly benevolent and infinitely omnipotent being is inconsistent with the occurrence of evil in this world; but he is incorrect if he equates such a being with God.
For definitely, a perfect being is not limited to the possession of just these two attributes. Let me now move on to my second point. Still, if Mr. Cruz does not pass a student it does not mean of course that he cannot or does not have the power to pass the student; nor does it mean that he does not desire the student to pass in his course. If Mr. Cruz, based on his fair and wise judgment, thinks that the student does not deserve to pass his course, then he ought to fail the student, though he desires the student to pass his course and it is within his power to give the student a passing mark.
If God creates good with making evil as means for attaining the good, it does not mean that God cannot create good without making evil as means for attaining the good. God simply chooses to create good in that way. If God creates a universe with some evil in it, it does mean that He cannot a create a universe without some evil in it. God simply chooses to create a universe in that way. If God creates a world in which humans are not always freely choosing the good, it does not mean He cannot create a world in which humans are always freely choosing the good.
He simply chooses to create the world we have today, in which humans are not always freely choosing the good. The point of Mackie is that if God is all-powerful, then it should be within His power to create such kind of humans.
God not creating such kind of humans is not due to the fact that God does not have the power to do so but that God simply chooses not to do so. Perhaps the better question is, are these things which God does inconsistent with or do not befit his Godly nature? What will be our standards to say this?
Some may think we are back to the old question raised by Socrates: Is something good because God wills it or God wills it because it is good? This is really a question of whether the God that one believes in is the true God. In this case, which God is the true God, the God whose will defines what is good or the God who follows a higher standard of goodness? It may be asked, what if God reverses all His commandments, would these reverse commandments still be good? I think the analysis should be that if God does that then he is actually not God.
What God does not do He chooses not to do, not because He cannot do it or does not have the power to do it. There is a big difference, to use an analogy, between a blind man not seeing a picture and a man with normal eyesight likewise not seeing the same picture because of deliberately not looking at the picture. In the case of the blind man, he does not see the picture because he cannot see it; but in the case of the man with normal eyesight he does not see the picture because for some reason he chooses not to look at it.
In the same way, if God does not eliminate some form of evil, it does not mean He does not desire to eliminate it or He does not have the power to eliminate it; it can only mean that God has decided not to eliminate it based on His wisdom or divine judgment.
But perhaps one may reply that all the other attributes of God, such as being wise, fair, and compassionate, are all included in His being wholly good. God, being a perfect being, must surely have other attributes, such as justice and compassion, among others, which likewise influence how He exercises His omnipotence. And in this case, we do not really have a problem of evil. Conclusion In conclusion, it is true that if God is wholly good then He should desire to eliminate evil or prevent it from occurring, but not if evil is necessary for God to exercise or assert His other divine attributes such as being just and wise.
It is likewise true that God is infinitely omnipotent, but it is up to God, according to His own wisdom and godly nature, how He will exercise this power. But a God who is not also just, compassionate, or wise is not the God that theists believe in. Thus, the problem of evil is not really a threat to theism.
Lastly, if there are things about God that we cannot seem to reconcile with certain occurrences in the world, I do not think it is necessarily attributable to some limitations of God which make His existence questionable.
For it may very well be due to our own limitations— the limitations of our own understanding or cognitive capacities, and perhaps also of our own logic. Works Cited Aquinas, Thomas. Thomas Aquinas. Part 1 QQ.
Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Hoffman, Joshua, and Rosenkrantz, Gary. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion. Masachussetts: Wiley- Blackwell, , Mackie, J. Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Reichenbach, Bruce. Evil and a Good God. New York. Fordham University Press, The Problem of Evil and the Power of God. Boston: Brill, Howard-Snyder, Daniel. Introduction: The Evidential Argument from Evil.
In The Evidential Argument from Evil. Edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Indiana: Indiana University Press, a, Indiana: Indiana University Press, b, Some examples are as follows. So if God had to introduce evil as a means to good, he must be subject to some causal laws. He suggests the following as a possible omnpiotence sufficient reason: The assumption behind this charge is that, evul so doing, God could leave human free will untouched.
We said above that a macki of statements is logically inconsistent if and only if that set includes a direct contradiction or a direct contradiction can be deduced from that set. An implicit assumption behind this part of the debate over the logical problem of evil is the following:. Those arguing for the existence of God have not been able to provide enough evidence to persuade everyone who argued against the existence of God. Some scholars maintain that Plantinga has rejected the idea of an omnipotent God because he claims there are some things God cannot do—namely, logically impossible things.
So either God is not omnipotent or there are some limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. They note that philosophers have always believed it is never rational to believe something contradictory. MSR1 claims that God cannot get rid of much of the evil and suffering in the world without also getting rid of morally significant free will.
Register Lost your password? Does it succeed in solving the logical problem of evil as it pertains to either moral or natural evil? If God can make people who freely choose to act well on some occasions, there is nothing logically impossible about him making people who freely choose the good on all occasions. In fact, it appears that even the most hardened atheist must admit that MSR1 and MSR2 are possible reasons God might have for allowing moral and natural evil.
It is difficult to see how a God who allowed bad things to happen just for the heck of it could be worthy of reverence, faith and worship.
It leaves several of the most important questions about God and evil unanswered. That is, that person would not be able to choose any bad option even if they wanted to. If you could point to an actual instance of the type of situation in question, that would certainly prove that 40 is false. They may all be false or some may be true and others false. He based his arguments on the problem of evil; however, he did not consider the view of evil as a test.
Here is a possible reason God might have for allowing natural evil: There is nothing contradictory about supposing that there is a possible world where free creatures always make the right choices and never go wrong.
It omnipotemce seems so. What is your profession? Alvin Plantingahas offered the most famous contemporary philosophical response to this question. However, as we all know, our world is filled with a staggering amount of evil and suffering. The Miracle of Theism. Evil, Omniscience and Omnipotence. Existence of pain and disease make possible sympathy, benevolence, heroism, and struggle to overcome these evils. Atheologians, as we saw above, claim that God is doing something morally blameworthy by allowing evil and suffering to exist in our world.
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